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Background: Electronic Patient Medication Record (ePMR) systems have important safety features embedded to
alert users about potential clinical hazards and errors. To date, there is no synthesis of evidence about the
effectiveness of these safety features and alerts at the point of pharmacy order entry. This review aims to
systematically explore the literature and synthesise published evidence about the effectiveness of safety features
and alerts in ePMR systems at the point of pharmacy order entry, in primary and secondary care.
Methods: We searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, Inspec, International Pharmaceutical Abstracts, PsycINFO, CINHAL
(earliest entry to March 2012) and reference lists of articles. Two reviewers examined the titles and abstracts, and
used a hierarchical template to identify comparative design studies evaluating the effectiveness of safety features
and alerts at the point of pharmacy order entry. The two reviewers independently assessed the quality of the
included studies using Cochrane Collaboration’s risk of bias tool.
Results: Three randomised trials and two before-after studies met our criteria. Four studies involved integrated care
facilities and one was hospital-based. The studies were all from the United States (US). The five studies
demonstrated statistically significant reduction in medication errors in patients with renal insufficiency, pregnant
women dispensed US Food Drug and Administration (FDA) risk category D (evidence of fetal risk but therapeutic
benefits can outweigh the risk) or X (evidence suggests that risk to the fetus outweighs therapeutic benefits)
medication, first dispensing of inappropriate medications in patients aged 65 and above, co-dispensing of
interacting drugs, and adverse drug events related to hyperkalaemia.
Conclusions: This systematic review shows that the safety features of ePMR systems are effective in alerting users
about potential clinical hazards and errors during pharmacy order entry. There are however, problems such as false
alerts and inconsistencies in alert management. More studies are needed from other countries and pharmacy
practice settings to assess the effectiveness of electronic safety features and alerts in preventing error and reducing
harm to patients.
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In 2011, over 950 million prescription items were dis-
pensed in community pharmacies in England alone [1].
This number is on an upward trajectory. Coupled with
the error producing and error provoking environment
[2] in which pharmacists work, it means that there are
numerous opportunities for medication errors to occur.
It has been suggested that technologies such as elec-
tronic Patient Medication Record (ePMR) systems can
help to prevent medication errors, reduce potentially in-
appropriate prescribing and prevent harm to patients
[3,4]. However, results from systematic reviews and re-
cent studies are indeterminate [5-8]. It has been
reported that pharmacy software is less than ideal [9]
and that safety alerts are often bypassed [10]. The sys-
tems have also been implicated as a cause of new risks
for errors [11,12].
The medication use process in the United Kingdom
(UK) comprises of four basic steps- prescribing, dispens-
ing, administration and monitoring. In primary care, a
prescription is usually generated by a general practitioner
within the National Health Service (NHS) framework. The
prescription is then presented at a community pharmacy
contracted by the NHS for dispensing. The term patient
medication record relates solely to the record of prescrip-
tions dispensed to a patient by an individual pharmacy
and covers items dispensed from NHS prescriptions, pri-
vate prescriptions and very occasionally, over-the-counter
medications. This record may be paper-based or kept in
electronic format on electronic Patient Medication Record
(ePMR) systems. These systems can be found in all pri-
mary and secondary care pharmacies in the UK. Other
names used for ePMR systems in the literature include
pharmacy computer system [13-15], pharmacy informa-
tion system [16,17] and pharmacy information manage-
ment system [18-21]. There is currently no common
specification for ePMR systems in the UK.
Prescriptions issued within the NHS in the UK are
usually computer generated although a prescription may
also be handwritten. In primary care, it is a legal require-
ment for a prescription to be dispensed under the super-
vision of a pharmacist. For this reason, pharmacists are
closely involved in the dispensing process. When a pre-
scription is received in the pharmacy, the medication or-
dered by the prescriber is entered into the ePMR system.
This step in the dispensing process is referred to as
pharmacy order entry. The task can be performed by
any qualified staff in the dispensary such as a dispenser,
technician or pharmacist depending on staff availability
and the workflow adopted within the respective phar-
macy. A recent development in the UK is the electronic
prescription service (EPS). EPS allows the electronic
transmission of the prescriber’s intentions direct to a
nominated dispensing pharmacy. The workflow withEPS mirrors that of physical prescriptions with the ex-
ception of manual item entry. All other steps are
performed as before so the ePMR system is still required
to make point of order entry checks.
In secondary care, the workflow is different. Pharma-
cists routinely perform clinical verifications in the ward
environment prior to dispensing in the main hospital
pharmacy without reference to electronic prescribing
systems. Although ePMR systems have some safety fea-
tures similar to those available in computerised phys-
ician order entry systems (CPOEs), the ePMR systems
used in community pharmacy in the UK are not nor-
mally interfaced with other clinical information systems
external to the pharmacy such as the patient’s primary
care health record maintained by the general practitioner
thus limiting the extent of their safety performance.
The majority of ePMR systems are stand-alone sys-
tems. Terminals may be networked together if there is
more than one in a particular pharmacy. The systems
are designed to support the operations of individual
pharmacies. They incorporate patient-specific demo-
graphic, medication and sometimes, clinical data to sup-
port review of medication for appropriateness. They are
also used for managing the inventory and can interact
fully with other clinical systems if enabled.
In addition to manual safety checks conducted by
pharmacists, ePMR systems are widely used in primary
and secondary care to support pharmacists’ clinical
decision-making and safe dispensing of medications dur-
ing pharmacy order entry. The safety features embedded
in them, alert users about potentially unsafe medica-
tions, drug combinations, interactions, clinical hazards,
errors and adverse events. Similar technologies such as
electronic prescribing systems, bar coding and automa-
tion are helping to cut down on occurrence of medica-
tion errors in other practice domains [22-24] but it has
been suggested that the performance of some of these
features is sub-optimal [15,25-27].
Data about the impact of safety features on pharma-
cists’ decision-making behaviour and medication error
prevention at the point of pharmacy order entry is
scant and often disparate. A number of closely related
studies found in literature have focused on different
perspectives such as the point of prescribing and ad-
ministration [28-30]. To our knowledge, there is no
published systematic review to date examining the type
of safety features in ePMR systems in primary and sec-
ondary care, and their effectiveness at the point of
pharmacy order entry.
To address this gap in literature, we carried out a sys-
tematic review to explore the literature and synthesise
published evidence about the effectiveness of safety fea-
tures and alerts in ePMR systems at the point of phar-
macy order entry in primary and secondary care
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an ePMR system is defined as, “a feature which enables
diverse pieces of clinical and patient information to be
compared in order to generate patient-specific advice or
alert about potential and known clinical hazards, at the
pharmacy order entry stage of the medication use
process thereby eliminating or minimising the risk of
harm to patients”.
Methods
Study identification and eligibility
The population
Studies of patient medication record or pharmacy order
entry systems used in pharmacies were included while
studies about other clinical information systems and cli-
nicians other than pharmacists were excluded.
The interventions
The interventions included alerts, warnings, or prompts
about safety of medications, appearing on ePMR systems
during pharmacy order entry or at the point of dispens-
ing in the pharmacy. Examples are drug-drug interac-
tions, therapeutic duplications, and allergy alerts. Drug
Utilisation Review (DUR) alerts generated for non-safety
reasons were excluded.
The outcomes
The outcomes of interest included changes in medica-
tion error, morbidity, mortality and adverse drug events.
Studies with outcomes not related to safety were
excluded.
The study types
Studies that used comparative designs to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of ePMR systems’ safety features and alerts at
the point of pharmacy order entry were included. For
example, randomised controlled trials and before-after
studies. Studies published only in abstract form were
excluded.
Sources of information and search strategy
Literature searches were conducted in MEDLINE (1946
to March 2012), EMBASE (1980 to March 2012), Inspec
(1969 to March 2012), International Pharmaceutical Ab-
stracts (1970 to March 2012), PsycINFO (1806 to March
2012) all on the OvidSP platform, and CINHAL (1986 to
March 2012) on EBSCOHOST platform. Secondary
sources such as online database Pharmacy Abstracts,
COCHRANE database, website of the Agency for
Healthcare Quality (AHRQ), reference lists of included
studies and Internet search engines were also searched.
Keywords for the searches included “alerts, warning, de-
cision support, pharmacist, pharmacy, expert system,
pharmacy information systems, PMR systems andpharmacy order entry”. The search terms were initially
used in MEDLINE and tailored to other databases. Cita-
tions were retrieved into Endnote X5. Details of the
search strategy used for the MEDLINE search are pro-
vided in the Appendix section.
Study selection and data extraction
Two reviewers (OO and VG) independently screened
the title and abstracts of articles to identify studies,
which met our inclusion criteria. The full articles for the
potentially relevant studies were retrieved and reviewed
by three reviewers (OO, MB and AA) based on study
type, study design, participants, settings, eligible out-
comes and interventions. A hierarchical template was
used to exclude non-relevant studies. No language re-
strictions were applied to the study selection process.
One investigator (OO) designed and used a template to
extract data from the articles included in the synthesis.
Two reviewers (MB and AA) verified the extracted data.
We resolved discrepancies by discussion until consensus
was reached.
Risk of bias in included studies
Two reviewers (OO and VG) independently assessed the
quality of the included studies using the Cochrane Collab-
oration’s risk of bias tool [31]. The studies included in the
synthesis were assessed individually for selection bias, allo-
cation sequence concealment, blinding of participants and
personnel, blinding of outcome assessment, incomplete
outcome data, selective reporting and other bias.
Results
The literature search returned 6084 articles: MEDLINE
(1034), EMBASE (1703), Inspec (132), International
Pharmaceutical Abstracts (1026), PsychINFO (35) and
CINAHL (2154). None of the secondary sources searched
returned any relevant article. Two reviewers (OO and
VG) reviewed the title and abstracts of the 5086, which
remained after removing duplicate articles. A total of 5031
citations did not meet our inclusion criteria and were ex-
cluded. We were unable to locate one article [32]. The full
articles of the remaining 54 citations were retrieved and
based on the set criteria, 49 articles were excluded, leaving
five eligible articles for the review. The excluded articles
were not about PMR systems (11), contained ineligible in-
terventions (2) or study designs (34), or were abstracts (2).
Figure 1 shows the summary of this information. Table 1
is a summary of the characteristics of the included studies
and the key findings.
Description of included studies, baseline characteristics of
patients and alerts
All the studies were from the US. Four of the five studies
were conducted in an integrated care facility (Health
MEDLINE-1946 to March 2012
(n=1034)
EMBASE - 1980 to March 2012
(n=1703)
Inspec - 1969 to March 2012
(n=132)
International Pharmaceutical
Abstracts - 1970 to March 2012
(n=1026)
PsycINFO - 1806 to March 2012
(n=35)
CINHAL - 1986 to March 2012
(n=2154)
Records identified for title and
abstract review (n=5086)
Records excluded on title
and abstract review
(n=5031)
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility (n=55)
Full-text articles excluded
with reasons (n=49)
Studies included in synthesis
(n=5)
Duplicate records
excluded (n=998)
Not about Patient
Medication Record
Systems (n=11)
Ineligible intervention
(n=2)
Ineligible study design 
(n=34)
Abstracts only (n=2)
Records identified through
database searching (n=6084)
Unable to locate(n=1)
Figure 1 Flow diagram of included and excluded studies.
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one in a hospital [14]. Three studies were randomised
controlled trials (RCTs) [20,33,34], while two were
before-after intervention design studies [14,21]. The
publication dates for the studies ranged from 2007–
2011. Four studies [20,21,33,34] compared baseline char-
acteristics of patients but only one explicitly reported no
significant differences in patients’ characteristics at base-
line [33]. The five studies evaluated alerts to contraindi-
cated prescribing in the following categories: drug-drug
[21], drug-laboratory [14,33], drug-pregnancy [34] and
drug-age [20].
Drug-drug interaction alert [21] generated when ad-
ministration of a drug with another drug is likely to re-
sult in an increase or decrease in the action of either
drug or result in an adverse effect that is not normally
associated with either drug. Drug-lab alert [14,33] is gen-
erated when administration of a drug requires close
monitoring of certain physiological parameters bothbefore and after administration. A drug-pregnancy alert
[34] is generated when administration of a drug is con-
traindicated in pregnancy while a drug-age alert [20] re-
lates to a warning to the user of the system that certain
medications might be contraindicated based on the age
of the patient. All four alerts are similar to alerts nor-
mally found in computerised prescriber order entry
(CPOE) systems but are notified to the pharmacist or
user of ePMR system at the point of pharmacy order
entry or dispensing.
Risk of bias in included studies
The results of the risk of bias assessment of included
studies are as shown in Table 2 (see Additional file 1 for
derivations for these results). Of the five studies
reported, three (RCTs) used computer generated se-
quence for randomisation and reported blinding of staff
and participants to group assignment so selection and
performance bias were judged as being a low risk. Allo-
cation concealment was judged as unclear risk as it was
not reported in any of the trials. The two before-after
studies were judged to be at high risk of selection, se-
quence concealment and performance bias.
Assessment of the primary outcome measure was
conducted in one of the studies and the study [33] was
judged to be of low risk of detection bias. The risk of
bias for the remaining four studies was judged as un-
clear. All the studies were judged as having a low risk of
attrition and reporting bias. The three RCT studies
reported false-positive alerts (alert wrongly indicating
the presence of the attribute for which the alert should
trigger) [20,33,34]. It was not clear if this could have in-
troduced other biases into the studies so they were all
judged to be of unclear risk of other bias. The two
before-after studies were also judged as being of unclear
risk of other bias because of the study design used.
Analysis of intervention effect
The interventions had positive effects on outcomes in all
the five studies.
Drug-drug interaction alert
In the study by Humphries, et al. [21], the primary out-
come measure was the proportion of patients co-
dispensed two critically interacting drugs. A 29% relative
reduction in dispensing of critically interacting drugs
was reported in the post-alert period, an average of 11.8
co-dispensing per 10,000 prescriptions over the entire
post-alert period versus the pre-alert period (24.7 per
10,000 prescriptions). The overall rate of co-dispensing
in the eight targeted drug pairs dropped sharply, from
21.3 to 14.7 per 10,000 prescriptions (p = 0.0125),
representing a relative decrease in co-dispensing of 31%
Table 1 Characteristics of studies and alerts included in the systematic review
Study Study type Intervention Setting* Country Outcomes measured Alert
functionality**
Improved
primary
outcome
(Yes/No)
False
positive
alerts
reported***
(Yes/No)
Note
Bhardwaja
et al. 2010
[33]
RCT Drug-lab alert
(Renal)
HMO US Proportion of medication
errors in drug selection or
dosing of targeted drugs
Medication
decision guide
printed in lieu
of the
prescription
label.
Yes Yes Pharmacists were trained to ensure
effective communication of the
reason for alerts and the rationale for
drug changes to prescribers and
patients. All activities were
documented electronically.
Raebel
et al. 2007
[34]
RCT Drug-pregnancy
alert
HMO US Primary - proportion of
pregnant women dispensed a
FDA category D or X
medication. Secondary - total
number of first dispensing of
targeted medications
Prescription
label not
printed until
pharmacist
intervened.
Yes Yes False positive alerts led to early
cancellation of study. Specific
intervention guideline and patient
counselling script were developed.
Raebel
et al. 2007
[20]
RCT Drug-age alert HMO US Proportion of first dispensing
of medications on the
targeted medication list
Prescription
label not
printed until
pharmacist
intervened.
Yes Yes Intervention guideline and patient
counselling script were developed.
Pharmacists were required to
complete an intervention note in the
system before being able to print the
prescription label. Notes were
reviewed retrospectively.
Humphries
et al. 2007
[21]
Before-After study
(no control)
Drug interaction
alert
(Contraindicated)
HMO US Proportion of patients co-
dispensed two critically
interacting drugs
Prescription
label not
printed,
pharmacist
must consult
with the
prescriber.
Yes … Pharmacists could bypass the alert.
They documented their activities
electronically. Decision support guide
was developed to aid them in
interpreting and resolving critical
alerts. Scripted conversations were
used to explain to patients the
reason for alerts and the rationale for
medication changes.
Mansour
et al. 2010
[14]
Before-After study
(no control)
Drug-lab alert Large teaching
hospital (504-bed)
US Proportion of hospitalised
patients requiring treatment
for hyperkalaemia
Pop-up alert
about patient’s
last reported
potassium level
Yes … Pharmacists documented their
response to the alert electronically.
They could override the alert but
were required to provide a reason for
doing so. Number of alerts was
retrieved through a report generated
by the information technology
pharmacist. Inconsistent response to
the alert led to the development of
the hyperkalaemia treatment
guideline.
* HMO – Health Maintenance Organisation, FDA – Food and Drug Administration, RCT – Randomised Controlled Trial.
** Alert generated when a trigger medication order was entered. *** Ellipses indicate false positive alerts were not reported.
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Table 2 Risk of bias summary
Study Allocation
(selection bias)
Allocation
sequence
concealment
Blinding of participants
and staff
(performance bias)
Blinding of outcome
assessment
(detection bias)
Incomplete
outcome data
addressed
Free of
selective
reporting
Free of
other bias
Bhardwaja
et al. 2010 [33]
Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Unclear
Raebel et al.
2007 [34]
Low Unclear Low Unclear Low Low Unclear
Raebel et al.
2007 [20]
Low Unclear Low Unclear Low Low Unclear
Humphries
et al. 2007 [21]
High High High Unclear Low Low Unclear
Mansour et al.
2010 [14]
High High High Unclear Low Low Unclear
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was implemented.
Drug-laboratory alert
The results of the two studies: a RCT [33] and a before-
after study [14] featuring drug-laboratory alerts indicated
that the intervention had a beneficial effect. The primary
outcome in the RCT [33], was the proportion of medica-
tion errors defined as target drugs that should be
avoided or were dosed inappropriately. In the usual care
group, 1853 patient-drug combinations were dosed in-
appropriately (49%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 47–
50%) out of 3796. In the intervention group, 1195
patient-drug combinations were dosed inappropriately
(33%, 95% CI 31–34%) out of 3639 which was signifi-
cantly lower than the usual care group (p<0.001). With
regard to target drugs that required a dosage adjustment,
1291 of the 3231 patient-drug combinations in the usual
care group were dosed inappropriately (40%, 95% CI 38–
42%). In the intervention group, 893 (27%, 95% CI 25–
28%) out of 3335 patient-drug combinations were dosed
inappropriately, which was considerably lower than the
usual care group (p<0.001).
In the before-after study [14], the alert warned phar-
macists about potassium level above the set value and
was tracked 63 times over the 3-month alert implemen-
tation period with the largest number of cases occurring
during order entry for a potassium supplement (20
cases) and an ACE inhibitor (34 cases). Prior to imple-
mentation of alert, 48 hospitalized patients were treated
for hyperkalaemia but only 14 cases of hyperkalaemia re-
quired treatment after the alert was implemented, a sta-
tistically significant decrease in ADEs related to
hyperkalaemia (p<0.001).
Drug-pregnancy alert
The primary outcome of the study by Raebel, et al. [34]
was the proportion of pregnant women dispensed US
FDA category D (evidence of fetal risk exists, but thera-
peutic benefits can outweigh the risk) or X (evidencefrom human or animal studies suggests that risk to the
fetus outweighs therapeutic benefit) medications. A total
of 177 (2.9%) women in the intervention group were dis-
pensed at least one medication from category D or X
compared with 276 (5.5%) women in the usual care
group (p<0.001).Drug-age alert
The intervention by Raebel, et al. [20] led to a decrease
in the proportion of patients aged 65 and over who were
newly prescribed potentially inappropriate medications.
In the analysis of dispensing of medications to patients
aged 65 and over, 543 of 29,840 (1.8%) patients
randomised to the intervention group were newly dis-
pensed at least one potentially inappropriate medication
compared to 644 of 29,840 (2.2%) in the usual care
group (p=0.002, 16% relative risk reduction).False alerts and alert management
The three RCT studies reported problems of false-
positive alerts [20,33,34]. In the study by Bhardwaja
et al. [16], false-positive alerts determined as the propor-
tion of alerts that had a creatinine clearance level > 51
ml/min on medical record review, reduced from 32% to
0.5% one year after the alert was changed to drug-
specific creatinine clearance cut-off. The study by
Raebel, et al. [34] was terminated early because of false-
positive alerts due to misidentification of medications as
contraindicated in pregnancy and incorrect alert that pa-
tients were pregnant. In another study [20], alerts for ex-
cluded indications were considered to be false-positives
but the authors did not indicate the extent of the
problem.
Mansour et al. [14] noted a lack of consistency in the
way pharmacists managed alerts during the first few
months following alert implementation. The management
team then developed the hyperkalaemia treatment guide-
lines to assist pharmacists when deciding whether to dis-
pense the prescribed medication and what suggestions to
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the hyperkalaemia alert.
In four of the studies, the medication alerts functioned
by preventing the prescription label from being printed
until the pharmacist had actively intervened to deter-
mine whether the prescription should be dispensed or
whether to contact the prescriber [20,21,33,34]. In one
study, a decision support guide was printed for the
pharmacist in lieu of the prescription label [33]. In an-
other, a pop-up screen appeared on screen, warning
pharmacists about patient’s last reported potassium level,
including a reminder regarding where to document the
response to the alert. Pharmacists could override alerts
as long as the reason for the override was explained and
the action documented [14].
Discussion
We identified five studies and each of these showed that
using alerts in ePMR systems resulted in reductions in
dispensing of critically interacting, contraindicated drugs
based on age or pregnancy, adverse drug events related
to hyperkalaemia and medication errors. Thus, ePMR
systems have the potential to improve patient safety by
processing personal and clinical information along with
medication records to provide patient specific advice.
This can help to reduce the risks that may arise from
taking prescribed or non-prescribed medicines. Never-
theless, while the interventions had a positive effect on
primary outcomes in the studies we identified, there
were instances of false alerts and discrepancies in alert
management.
Comparisons with other studies
Results from this review support some of the findings
from other studies that have looked at the performance
of safety features in ePMR systems. It has been sug-
gested that only known hazards and not theoretical pos-
sibilities should be listed as contraindicated drug-drug
combinations and that alerts are taken seriously if users
are alerted to situations that require action in order to
improve patient safety [35]. This is a plausible explan-
ation for why the evaluated studies focused on specific
instances and group of drugs.
False alert, intervention guideline and alert management
Problems of false-positive alerts appear to be prevalent
[20,33,34]. This may result from programming deficien-
cies [25], lack of required information, misclassification
of alerts [34], among others leading to reduction in spe-
cificity and sensitivity of alerts. False alerts, and alerts
that are not clinically significant, may result in pharma-
cists ignoring clinically important alerts [36-38]. It has
been reported that pharmacists often override alerts gen-
erated about drug-drug interactions which they receive[39] and information and advice from the alerts are
often ignored [40,41]. One of the studies was terminated
early because of false-positive alerts [34].
Active collaboration between pharmacists, physicians,
and other relevant stakeholders is necessary when devel-
oping target medication lists and indications for which
an intervention should occur. Collaborative development
of intervention guidelines and implementation of the
intervention are also some of the ways in which stake-
holders can work together to make alerts more relevant,
useful and effective in practice thereby guaranteeing the
success of any intervention programme.
Linking patient medication records with other clinical
data when possible expands the scope of checks for clin-
ically hazardous situations at the point of pharmacy
order entry [20,34]. However, inadequate knowledge of
the safety features available or necessary in ePMR sys-
tems coupled with lack of training on how to deal with
some alerts can result in sub-optimal use of the safety
features in ePMR systems. Development of treatment
and alert-response guidelines, decision support guides,
and training offer an opportunity to ensure consistency
in the way pharmacists intervene or manage alerts.
Evaluating cases where pharmacists did not adhere to
recommendations in alerts and the reasons for non-
adherence would be useful in fine-tuning alerts during
future developments to enhance the effectiveness of
safety alerts and prevent over-alerting and alert fatigue.
Results from observational studies have shown that
pharmacists override or ignore alerts. In one observa-
tional study, pharmacists expressed lack of trust in the
clinical significance and accuracy of the alert informa-
tion consequently leading to alerts being overridden
[40]. Indermitte et al. [36], found that alerts for potential
drug interactions were graded as severe, moderate and
minor. Pharmacists could select the levels of alerts to
flag in the system during order entry leading to variation
in the systems and overriding of alerts that were consid-
ered insignificant. User friendliness of the systems can
be increased by customisation but may also lead to vari-
ation in the system [13]. Lack of an agreed standard and
consensus about severity levels for drug interactions is a
major reason for the variation, which exists between
ePMR systems, as vendors have no choice than to rely
on their preferred or own classification system [15].
The evaluated safety features were created based on
the needs of the respective institutions and a desire to
prevent adverse events in various clinical situations. This
suggests that safety features embedded in ePMR systems
in different domains may not always be the same. This
has implications for commercial ePMR systems, as they
may not always meet the needs of users in every domain
without customisation. Although customisation of alerts
is not often possible in primary care pharmacy, ePMR
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medications and have the option to choose what they
would like to be alerted about to prevent over-alerting
and automatic behaviour towards alerts.
Strengths and limitations
One of the strengths of this systematic review is its
rigorousness. It is also the first one in the field, to our
knowledge, that has examined the effectiveness of safety
features and alerts in ePMR systems at the point of
pharmacy order entry in primary and secondary care.
There are some limitations to this review. Alerts on
non-pharmacy systems are beyond the scope of this re-
view. Although pharmacists managed the alerts in the
studies evaluated in this review, this may not be a true
reflection of the practice situation in some countries and
practice domains. It is often the case that the person
processing a medication order is not the pharmacist.
Some pharmacists allow their support staff to override
alerts up to a certain degree of severity without an initial
discussion with the pharmacist. In such circumstances,
it is important to keep the pharmacist informed about
important alerts if someone else handles the prescrip-
tion. There have been concerns that important interac-
tions could be missed if dispensing staff do not alert
pharmacists appropriately [39].
Implications for policy and practice
The point of pharmacy order entry is regarded as a
safety net in preventing medication error and adverse
drug events (ADEs) once a prescription has been issued
[42,43]. This systematic review provides evidence that
alerts are useful for picking up medication errors and
potential clinical hazards at the point of pharmacy order
entry. From a policy perspective, it is important to con-
sider strengthening regulations around the provision of
safety features in ePMR systems. It is also important to
ensure that such systems are designed in a way that
maximises the likelihood of pharmacists taking appropri-
ate actions. Increasing the specificity of alerts by taking
into account individual patient context will help reduce
the number of false alerts leading to alert bypass. From a
practice perspective, it is important that pharmacists
recognise the value of ePMR systems in preventing the
dispensing of hazardous prescriptions, and therefore pay
attention to electronic alerts even if over-alerting re-
mains a problem for some time to come.
Further research
Although this review provided some insight into the ef-
fectiveness of safety features and alerts in ePMR systems,
it has also highlighted gaps in this subject area. The re-
view did not identify any study that has evaluated the ef-
fectiveness of other safety features that may be found inePMR systems such as safety features for screening for
therapeutic duplication, allergies, adherence issues, ex-
cessive and sub-optimal doses, inappropriate prescribing
and drug-drug interactions (non-contraindicated) at the
point of pharmacy order entry. All the studies were from
the US and none from community pharmacy. We also
do not know the influence of various design features on
user-acceptance of alerts. These gaps in the literature
need addressing.
The impact of and handling of alerts by migrant phar-
macists and cross-sector pharmacists who often have to
use ePMR systems that they may not be familiar with is
yet to be explored. Generating evidence in this area will
help to promote an understanding of the challenges
faced by migrant pharmacists to prevent error promot-
ing situations that may arise when using such systems.
More research needs to be done to investigate the im-
pact of alert customisation and standards for ePMR sys-
tems and alerts on patient safety. Some alerts will not
flag when prescriptions are dispensed from pharmacies
that a patient does not use regularly, if the relevant
ePMR system does not have the historical medication
record of that patient. The potential patient safety bene-
fits from making information about medications pre-
scribed to patients and other details such as patients’
allergy status, available to the dispensing pharmacy at
the point of order entry should be explored.
Conclusions
This systematic review shows that ePMR systems in con-
junction with the embedded safety features are effective
in picking up and reducing potential problems and clin-
ical hazards at the point of pharmacy order entry. There
are, however, problems of false alerts and inconsistencies
in alert management. Due to low number of relevant
studies, there was insufficient evidence to enable ad-
equate comparison of the safety features evaluated
across practice domains or studies. More studies are
needed to assess the effectiveness of other safety features
that are present in ePMR systems such as dosing guid-
ance based on age, therapeutic duplication, and drug-
allergy screening. Design features associated with safety
alert acceptance and effectiveness should be evaluated.
Finding appropriate solutions to these problems is a
challenge but it is of paramount importance to
strengthen the safety net and continue to prevent harm
to patients.
Appendix
Search protocol used for identifying studies in Medline
1. (e adj2 prescrip$).mp. [mp=title, abstract, original
title, name of substance word, subject heading
word, unique identifier]
Ojeleye et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2013, 13:69 Page 9 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/13/692. (elec$ adj prescrip$).mp. [mp=title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
3. exp Drug Labeling/
4. Drug Utili?ation Review.mp. [mp=title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
5. Pharmacy Information System$.mp.
6. Patient Medication Record$.mp. [mp=title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
7. (Pharmacy or Pharmacies or Pharmacist$).mp.
[mp=title, abstract, original title, name of substance
word, subject heading word, unique identifier]
8. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7
9. (Safety adj2 (Alert$ or Feature$ or Alarm$ or
Warning$ or Prompt$)).mp. [mp=title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
10. (Over?rid$ adj25 Alert$).mp. [mp=title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word, subject
heading word, unique identifier]
11. Reminder System$/
12. alert$.mp.
13. Decision Support$.mp.
14. exp Decision Making, Computer-Assisted/
15. exp Drug Dosage Calculations/
16. 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15
17. 8 and 16Additional file
Additional file 1: Table S1. Risk of bias assessment.
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